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TINKER TAILORED: GOOD FAITH, CIVILITY,
AND STUDENT EXPRESSION
MARK G. YUDOF"
I am delighted to be speaking on the occasion of the 25th anniversary
of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.' I have
been interested in educational policy and the law since 1969, the year after
my graduation from law school, and the year in which Tinker was decided.
For me, Tinker has always remained a new and interesting case. My
interest is illustrated by the fact that my favorite movie is Groundhog Day.
In the movie, Groundhog Day repeats itself over and over again until Bill
Murray, who plays the main character, straightens out his life and wins the
love of the character played by Andie McDowell. I feel similarly about
Tinker; I analyze this case again and again, and eventually I should get it
right. There is, however, little sign of that success thus far.
Tinker has been dramatically transformed by its progeny. There is a
Biblical adage from Jeremia that states, "The fathers ate unripe grapes, and
the children's teeth are set on edge .... 2 This adage is applicable to the
United States Supreme Court and its holdings in relation to Tinker. Tinker
was one of the last cases decided by the Warren Court,3 and I believe the
case has caused considerable "gnashing of teeth" by the members of the
* Executive Vice President and Provost, University of Texas at Austin School of Law-
L.L.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1968; B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1965.
'393 U.S. 503 (1969).
2 Jeremia 31:29.
The Warren Court spanned the years 1953-1969. The following justices participated in the
1969 Tinker decision: Earl Warren, Abe Fortas, Hugo L. Black, William 0. Douglas, John M.
Harlan, William J. Brennan, Jr., Potter Stewart, Byron R. White, and Thurgood Marshall. See
ARNOLD S. RICE, THE WARREN COURT, 1953-1969, at IX (1987).
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Burger and Rehnquist Courts. Although these Courts have not specifically
overruled Tinker, Tinker's progeny have greatly altered the holding set
forth by the Warren Court.
Public schools are increasingly viewed by courts today as total
institutions, devoted to the socialization of the young and to the inculcation
of values and skills.' Students are viewed as members of the school
community who must adhere to communal norms. Today, children in
public schools are viewed less as the bearers of individual rights and more
as the repositories of community responsibilities.'
Tinker established the rule that school authorities may not suppress
student speech unless they can demonstrate that the suppression was
necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or
discipline.6 The basic premise of Tinker is that students retain their
freedom of expression in the public school environment as long as their
exercise of that freedom does not unduly hinder the school's achievement
of its educational mission.7
Most importantly, the Tinker decision is rights-based. Children do not
forfeit their rights when they walk into the public school any more than
they do when they walk out of the public school. Such rights, however,
are not absolute and must be assessed according to the impact that they will
have on other students and on the school itself. This balancing of interests
is similar to judicial assessment of rules relating to parade permits, or
' Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 n.9 (1979) (citing R. DAWSON & K. PREWITT,
POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION 158-67 (1977): R. HESS & J. TORNEY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
POLITICAL ATrITUDES IN CHILDREN 162-63, 217-18 (1967)). In Ambach. the Supreme Court
upheld a state statute forbidding public school teacher certification to any person who was not a
United States citizen unless such person manifested the intention to apply for citizenship. Ambach.
441 U.S. at 69. The Court stressed the importance of public schools in the preparation of
individuals for participation as United States citizens and in the preservation of the values of our
democratic system. Id. at 76.
The argument is, furthermore, that a legitimate and substantial community interest exists in
promoting respect for authority and for traditional social, moral, and political values. Board of
Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982).
1 See generally Tracy M. Lorenz, Note, Value Training: Education or Indoctrination? A
Constitutional Analysis, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 593 (1992) (discussing tension in education between
advancing individual rights and promoting community values in public schools).
6 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. In Tinker, high school students were suspended for wearing black
armbands in school to protest the Vietnam War. Id. at 504. The Court weighed the students' First
Amendment rights to free speech against the school's interest in prescribing and controlling
conduct in schools. Id. at 507. The Court held that such freedom of expression. in the absence
of a material interference with the school's work or with the rights of other students, is
constitutionally protected. Id. at 511.
7 Id.; see also MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS. LAW. AND
GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 213 (1983).
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protests in front of the Pentagon, a courthouse, or some other public
building. Such rules restrict the freedoms of association and assembly8
and are assessed according to the particular context in which they are
asserted.
Tinker employed a mixed fact-law rule.9 I have always thought this
rule rendered Tinker's application treacherous, difficult, and unpredictable.
When I was a law professor, I used to ask my students the following
questions: What constitutes a disruption? How much disruption will
outweigh the assertion of the right? How are these interests balanced? Is
this rule, with its emphasis on identifying disruption in schools, a rule at
all, or is it just an invitation to judges to assert their personal ideologies
and persuasions? These, however, are not the only issues to address. I
believe that it is as important, or perhaps more important, to determine
what constitutes the ongoing work of an institution as it is to determine
what can disrupt the routines of an institution.
Writing for the majority in Tinker, Justice Fortas stated that the work
of the school is indirectly and inextricably linked with the definition of
disruption."° Justice Fortas said that the Tinker children were silent and
orderly, and that there was no evidence of material and substantial
disruption or interference with schoolwork or discipline." Although a
few hostile remarks were directed at the Tinker children outside of the
classroom, there were no threats made or acts of violence committed on the
school premises. 2 For Justice Fortas, the work of the school is defined
narrowly. Teachers, for example, present materials in class, assign
readings, initiate discussions, hold study periods, and oversee projects.
School authorities fail to satisfy the substantial disruption test when: (1) the
student's speech does not interfere with, or is unlikely to interfere with, the
school's direct teaching activities; (2) the communication from the teacher
to the students or from the students back to the teacher is in a structured
I See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972) (holding that college has legitimate
interest in preventing disruption on campus although "heavy burden" rests on college to justify
any such restraints): NAACP v. Alabama. 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (holding that state action
which curtails freedom to associate is subject to closest scrutiny), enforced, 360 U.S. 240 (1959).
1 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. "It can hardly be argued that . . . students . . . shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Id. at 506.
When this speech materially and substantially interferes with the discipline or operations of the
school. however, the school officials' actions in suppressing student speech may be justified. Id.
at 509.
10 Id. at 512-13.
" Id. at 508.
2 Tinker. 393 U.S. at 508.
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setting; and (3) there is no violence or threat of violence.13  For the
Tinker majority, the work of the school is its formal curriculum and its
ability to pursue this curriculum in each classroom. The Tinker children
did not drown out their teachers, nor did they prevent anyone from
responding. The children's protest was passive and largely silent.
There are, however, other ways to define the mission of the public
school. For another interpretation, one may turn to Justice Black's dissent,
one of his most intemperate opinions. Justice Black concluded that the
Tinker children did disrupt the school. 4 This conclusion, however, was
premised on his interpretation of the school's mission. Justice Black stated:
While the absence of obscene remarks or boisterous and loud disorder
perhaps justifies the Court's statement that the few armband students did
not actually 'disrupt' the classwork, I think the record overwhelmingly
shows that the armbands did exactly what the elected school officials and
principals foresaw they would, that is, took the students' minds off their
classwork and diverted them to thoughts about the highly emotional
subject of the Vietnam war [sic].' 5
To Justice Black, the public school's educational mission is not limited
to the formal curriculum or to the presentations by teachers and students.
Rather, the whole school enterprise is an instrument of socialization, an
instrument for teaching about discipline and disciplinary rules, and about
the authority structure within that school.16 In other words, Justice Black
believed that all the interactions that take place in school are part of the
school's curricular and socializing mission.
The school, in Justice Black's view, is a limited community,
established by the State, defined by elected officials, governed by
administrators and teachers, and peopled by students. ' Justice Black
believed that, in Tinker, the school officials' action was appropriate. The
Tinker children sought to convey ideas within the school that the school
itself had not accepted as within the scope of its curriculum, and the
students were, or might reasonably have been, distracted from their
assigned classwork and from the institutional routines. "[Plublic school
'I Id. at 512-13.
14 Id. at 517-18 (Black, J., dissenting) ("Even a casual reading of the record shows that this
armband did divert students' minds from their regular lessons .... .
IS Id. at 518 (Black. J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 524-25 (Black, J., dissenting) ("School discipline. . . is an integral and important
part of training our children to be good citizens-to be better citizens."); see Mark G. Yudof.
Libra, Book Selection and the Public Schools: The Quest for the Archimedean Point. 59 IND.
L.J. 527 (1984).
17 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting).
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students [are not] sent to the schools at public expense to broadcast political
or any other views to educate and inform the public." 8 The original idea
of schools-which Justice Black found attractive-was that children had not
yet reached a point of experience and wisdom that would enable them to
teach their elders. According to Justice Black, students are in school to
learn, but they have few free-standing rights. 9
If Justice Black's opinion was something of a polemic, the dissenting
opinion of Justice Harlan, in Tinker, was both more restrained and more
lucid. Justice Harlan simply stated that, although public school authorities
are not exempt from constitutional requirements with respect to freedom of
expression, they have wide discretion when carrying out their responsibili-
ties.2' For Justice Harlan, the question in each case is whether the
suppression of student speech is motivated by legitimate school concerns
or by prejudice. In Justice Harlan's view only efforts to suppress the
unpopular point of view or to do something other than to educate render
the exercise of school authority over student speech unconstitutional.2'
Justice Harlan, after reviewing the record of Tinker, found that the school
officials acted in good faith.' The question of good faith, however, like
the question of disruption, is only intelligible with a prior understanding of
the scope of the school's mission or purpose. Justice Harlan never
addressed the issue of disruption, nor did he write about the good faith
forecast of disruption.
My view is that Justice Harlan largely accepted Justice Black's broader
definition of education, which dictates that the whole school is the
curriculum. School administrators cross constitutional boundaries only
when they fail to promote learning; this occurs any time they do something
other than educate, administrate, or teach. The courts can overturn a
decision made by school authorities regarding student speech only when
school officials try to suppress speech for the sole reason that they dislike
or disagree with the ideas within the speech.
Reviewing Justice Harlan's view of education with regard to balancing
the rights of students and the authority of officials is important because
there is some risk of going back to the future. The progeny of Tinker seem
to be gravitating back toward Justice Harlan's original broad view of
Is Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
'9 Id. at 523-24 (Black, J., dissenting) ("[Piublic schools . . . are operated to give students
an opportunity to learn, to talk politics by active speech, or by 'symbolic speech."').
o Id. at 526 (Harlan, 1.. dissenting) ("[S]chool officials should be accorded the widest
authority in maintaining discipline and good order in their institutions.").
I d. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
- Tinker. 393 U.S. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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education set forth in his dissent 25 years ago. The importance of this
dissent illustrates the ability of dissenting opinions to gain judicial converts
over generations. Justice Harlan's dissent is becoming more powerful, not
only through a broader conceptualization of the educational mission, but
also through a redefinition of the rules governing a school community,
particularly with respect to civility. Community members must have a
baseline understanding of the ground rules for discourse. I see an
articulation of these community ground rules in a number of cases that
followed Tinker.
The first major case to redefine Tinker was Board of Education, Island
Trees Union Free School District v. Pico,' decided in 1982. In this case,
Pico challenged the school administration's decision to remove particular
books from the school library.24 The plurality opinion, written by Justice
Brennan, stated that there are limits on the State's power to control the
library and the classroom.' Citing Ambach v. Norwick,26 however,
Justice Brennan also acknowledged the importance of public schools'
obligation both to prepare individuals for active citizenship and to inculcate
students with fundamental values.27
The Court then reaffirmed the student rights analysis set forth in
Tinker. The problem that Justice Brennan confronted in this case was
reconciling the rights concept of Tinker with the broad definition of the
public schools' inculcation role. Justice Brennan addressed this conflict by
defining a student's right to receive information and have access to books
in a library.28 In my judgment, however, this application of a right to
know in the context of public schooling is not coherent. Justice Brennan
himself indicated the invalidity of this distinction when he limited the
standard. He then asserted that if the school officials were motivated to
remove books because they were not educationally suitable or because they
were pervasively vulgar, then the removal would be constitutional.2 If,
however, the removal was motivated by partisan political concerns or by
2 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
2 Id. at 855-56.
- Id. at 861.
441 U.S. 68 (1979). In Ambach, the Court upheld the states' authority to deny teaching
positions to resident aliens who were eligible for United States citizenship, but who refused to
seek naturalization. Id. at 79-80. In arriving at this conclusion, Justice Powell, writing for the
majority, determined that -teaching in public schools constitutes a governmental function...
'that go[es] to the heart of representative government."' Id. at 75-76 (quoting Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)).
27 Pico, 457 U.S. at 864 (citing Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68. 76-77 (1979)).
1 Pico, 457 U.S. at 867; see Yudof, supra note 16, at 542.
29 Pico, 457 U.S. at 871.
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the desire to suppress only certain types of ideas, then the removal would
be unconstitutional.30
The problem with Justice Brennan's rationale is that it indicates that
there are both good and bad reasons to remove books from the library. In
either instance, however, the right to know has been violated because the
book has been removed. For example, consider a book written by former
member of the Ku Klux Klan, David Duke.3' In one scenario, the book
is excised from the library for poor grammar, and in another, it is excised
because it is ideologically repugnant. In either scenario, regardless of the
reason for its removal, the same book is gone.
The Pico decision is important for several reasons. First, the standard
for removing books is virtually identical to that set forth in Justice Harlan's
dissenting opinion in Tinker.32  The Court must answer the following
questions: Why were the books removed? Were they removed for
pedagogical or educational reasons? Were they removed for ideological or
partisan reasons? Were they removed for some other prejudicial reason
outside of the school's mission? This subjective test is similar to the test
set forth by Justice Harlan. The primary concern of the subjective test
depends on questions like what is ultra vires and what is good faith.
A second concern is that the references to vulgarity make it clear that,
in the special public school community, administrators may promote civility
of discourse, whether in class or in the library. In other words, the
educational mission encompasses socialization and civility. This assertion
deals with a separate issue involving the relationship between an education-
al community and civility of discourse. As Justice Blackmun stated:
I do not suggest that the State has any affirmative obligation to provide
students with information or ideas, something that may well be associated
with a 'right to receive' [information] .... [I]f schools may be used to
inculcate ideas, surely libraries may play a role in that process. Instead,
I suggest that certain forms of state discrimination between ideas are
improper.... The school is designed to, and inevitably will, inculcate
ways of thought and outlooks ... 
30Id.
3, See David Maraniss. Duke's Obsession: White Supremacy with a Plan, WASH. PosT, Nov.
10, 1991, at Al. David Duke, former leader of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, is well known
for white supremacist views and racism.
•2 Compare Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (discussing freedom of students
to receive information and authority of officials to limit that right) with Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (discussing students' freedom of speech and
expression and authority of school officials to suppress freedom).
S'1 Pico. 457 U.S. at 878-79 (Blackmun. J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
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I believe that this view sets forth a narrow principle. School officials
must be able to choose one book over another without judicial interference.
School officials should have the discretion to decide whether one book as
compared to another is more relevant, better written, or less lewd. Thus,
according to Justice Blackmun, if school authorities are not playing
ideological favorites, removal should be permitted.34
Pico evolved from Tinker, but technically the rule of good faith and
reasonable relationship to the pedagogical mission articulated by Justice
Harlan's dissent has only been applied in a context where the school is
promulgating its own messages. In other words, although the rule has been
applied to the library, the classroom, and other school forums, it has not
yet been applied to the personal speech of individual students.35
Four years later, the Supreme Court decided Bethel School District v.
Fraser.36  Fraser centered around a young man, Matthew Fraser, who
nominated a fellow student for office by making a speech that was filled
with sexual innuendo. 37  Fraser was suspended for three days for deliver-
ing this speech and violating a school disciplinary rule.38 Chief Justice
Burger, writing the opinion for the Supreme Court, upheld the suspen-
sion.39
Chief Justice Burger began his exegesis by purporting to apply Tinker,
but he barely addressed the disruption test. The Fraser decision represents
the gnashing of the teeth while the Tinker decision represents the unripe
grapes. Justice Burger emphasized that Fraser's discourse was not political
speech,' but, rather, profane speech4 used at a school activity42 that
students were required to attend in order to elect student officers.4 3
The holding in Fraser is difficult to understand when viewed in light
. Id. at 879-80 (Blackmun. J.. concurring).
3 See Mark G. Yudof, Personal Speech and Government Expression. 38 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 671 (1988).
36 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
3' Id. at 677-78.
3 Id. at 685.
39 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. The Court upheld the authority of the school board to impose
sanctions on Fraser for what the Court considered lewd and indecent speech. In doing so. Justice
Burger, writing the opinion of the Court, distinguished Fraser from Tinker by asserting that the
penalties in Fraser were unrelated to political preferences. Id. Instead. Fraser held that the First
Amendment in no way restricted school officials from determining lewd and vulgar speech was
against school policy if such speech undermined the school's basic educational mission. Thus,
the school board acted appropriately. Id.
4 id.
41 Id.
42 Fraser. 478 U.S. at 677.
41 d.
[Vol. 69:365
TINKER AND ITS PROGENY
of Tinker. If a nominating speech for political office is not political
speech, then what constitutes political speech? Though the speech may
have contained profane language and improper innuendo, what could be
more political than a speech nominating a candidate for elective office? In
addition, there was no disruption as defined by Justice Fortas in Tinker.'
Those at the assembly may have felt somewhat embarrassed, but there was
no disruption. Thus, Fraser really has nothing to do with Tinker. I believe
the Chief Justice established a broader view of education by including
inculcation of the habits and manners of civility, and the preparation of
people for citizenship, self-government, and other similar virtues among the
responsibilities of the school system. Although Chief Justice Burger
recognized the need to prepare students to be tolerant of others' views, he
also emphasized that these fundamental values must be taught without
ignoring the sensibilities of others in the school process.45 Burger then
made the following statement, which was vitally important to the evolution
of his concept of the public school mission:
The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not
confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must
teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order.... The
schools, as instruments of the state, may determine that the essential
lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that
tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such as that
indulged in by this confused boy.'
This statement gives one the impression that Chief Justice Burger found
Fraser to be mentally disturbed.
Once again, relate this view to the Tinker case and compare the
breadth of the educational mission discussed by Burger. He expressly
stated that the mission is not limited to the curriculum,47 the civics class,
or the books.' He further stated that student speech need not necessarily
have any disruptive effect on the overt curriculum before the school can
suppress it.49 Instead, it is sufficient for student speech to have an
indirect disruptive effect on the broader mission of the public schools as
defined by BurgerO There is no frontal assault on Tinker. Though
Tinker is blended into this analysis in a way that makes one think it is good
4 See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
4 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
6 Id.
' Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.
4 Id. at 512-13.
49 Id. at 509.
10 Id. at 512-13.
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law, it is difficult to determine how Tinker applied to the situation at hand.
Two years after Fraser, the Supreme Court decided Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier.5 Much has been written about the Hazelwood
decision and I am sure many of you have read about its holding. In
Hazelwood, the Supreme Court decided the question of whether the
principal of a public school could constitutionally exercise control over the
content of a school newspaper called "Spectrum." 5 2 The newspaper was
published by the school at public expense. The editors were members of
a journalism class and received credit for their written work for the
newspaper. Most key decisions were made by the faculty advisor.
Because the newspaper was run by students with school support, there was
a great debate concerning which group had ultimate control of the
newspaper. The Court decided that the school, not the students, had
control of the newspaper.53 Justice White then stated that, if the school
controlled the newspaper, it was not created as a public forum for the
communication of the personal views of students 4.5  Rather, the newspa-
per was an extension of the curriculum, serving "as a supervised learning
experience for journalism students." 55 Justice White further stated that:
The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate
particular student speech-the question that we addressed in Tinker-is
different from the question whether the First Amendment requires a
school affirmatively to promote particular student speech. The former
question addresses educators' ability to silence a student's personal
expression that happens to occur on the school premises. The latter
question concerns educators' authority over school-sponsored publications,
theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students,
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the
imprimatur of the school.56
The distinction drawn here is between the personal speech of the student
and the speech attributed to the school. School administrators feared,
among other things, that because the school sponsored the newspaper,
anything published in the newspaper would be perceived as representing the
view of the school.57
51 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
12 Id. at 262.
-3 Id. at 270.
1 Id.
.s- Id.
51 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-71.
" Id. at 271. In Hazelivood, the Court distinguished between independent student newspapers
and school-sponsored newspapers. Id. The Court ruled that school officials may constitutionally
[Vol. 69:365
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The Hazelwood decision identifies two ways in which the issue of free
speech may arise in public schools. The first way is through some attack
on the school system's ability to promote its own message. For example,
a teacher may say, "I don't want to teach that course. I don't want to
teach in those words," or an administrator may say, "I don't like those
books in the library. I don't like what the students propose for the
newspaper." The second manner in which free speech issues arise in the
public schools is through student conduct, such as when students publish
an underground newspaper, speak in the hallway, or wear an armband.
The Hazelwood decision identifies different rules for these two types of
speech.
After Hazelwood, genuine Tinker speech is still subjected to the
disruption test. Once it is determined, however, that the government is
somehow implicated by the speech, then any limitations placed on that
speech must be made in good faith and be reasonably related to a legitimate
pedagogical purpose. One way to limit the government in a sensitive area
is to counter the government viewpoint with other speech. Another way
is to get the school to alter its message, an endeavor which is much more
complex and controversial. This goal could be achieved by calling for the
purchase of different types of books on the subject, by authorizing different
lesson plans for the teachers, or by allowing theatrical productions on the
subject.
I am probably one of the few academics who embraces the dichotomy
that has arisen after Hazelwood. Professor Gress has said that he is
puzzled by this dichotomy because he believes that the resulting harm in
these cases is the same. It does not really matter to him whether the
newspaper is a school newspaper or a student newspaper because in either
case the students do not have the opportunity to express their views.
Additionally, Professor Stanley Ingber stated at this Symposium that the
Hazelwood Court arguably portrayed the premise of Tinker as holding that
school children, too, have fundamental First Amendment rights. 5  With
all deference to my good colleague, that argument has no basis.
I do not think Hazelwood, on its face, signals the demise of Tinker.
The Hazelwood decision simply clarifies the distinction between personal
control the content of student speech in a school-sponsored newspaper as long as such control
serves a legitimate pedagogical interest. Id. at 273. It reconciled its outcome with Tinker in that
a school may refuse to lend its name and resources to further student expression without violating
the First Amendment but may not suppress the free speech of students absent material or
substantial disruption. Id.
11 See Stanley Ingber, Liberty andAuthority: Two Facets of the Inculcation of Virtue, 69 ST.
JOHN'S L.REv. 421 (1995).
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and government expression. Although I think the holding in Hazelwood is
persuasive, I think there may be reason for concern. I think Professors
Gress and Ingber may have had a prescient idea here. The problem is that
this trend toward defining the school's socialization mission in broader
terms is on a collision course with the substantial disruption test.59 More
recently, and equally as important, the lower courts on a number of
occasions have appeared confused over the scope of the Hazelwood
decision. Again, the Hazelwood test is whether school officials use good
faith and reasonableness in regulating the curriculum. Hazelwood has now
been applied to the academic freedom of teachers. This application
changes the analysis from a self-embodied, free-standing right, to more of
a cog in the process of socialization. The lower courts have also begun to
apply this test of good faith and reasonableness to the speech of students.
This is an outcome which Hazelwood did not authorize and which is
certainly inconsistent with Tinker.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Baxter
v. Vigo County School Corporation,' upheld a ban on a T-shirt bearing
language that protested racism and grading policies at a school. Citing
Fraser and Hazelwood, the court actually said that the Supreme Court has
cast some doubt on the extent to which Tinker remains viable and that
students retain free speech rights.6" In addition, the court in Baxter
applied Tinker in a context that the Hazelwood Court presumably would not
have.
Recently, in Webster v. Lenox School District,62 the Seventh Circuit
also treated Hazelwood as a case of general application, applicable to both
types of speech in the school. 63 In yet another case, Gano v. School
District No. 411 of Twin Falls County,64 students sold humorous T-shirts
depicting three inebriated administrators drinking alcoholic beverages. The
court upheld the students' suspension. Once again, the broad language of
Hazelwood was used without distinguishing the individual's message from
the school's message. This, along with the notion of civility set forth in
Fraser, carried the day.
My feeling is that good lawyers can distinguish these cases from
Tinker. Much of the troublesome language that I have cited is dictum, but
59 See supra text accompanying notes 10-13.
60 26 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 1994).
61 Id. at 737.
6- 917 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1990).
61 Id. at 1008.
4 674 F. Supp. 796 (D. Idaho 1987).
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I think there is a genuine reason for concern. The distinguished biologist
J. Steven Gould stated that "[t]he beauty of nature lies in detail; the
message, in generality. Optimal appreciation demands both . "..."65 1
think the same premise holds true for the law in this area. In my
judgment, the courts need to appreciate the generality of Tinker and the
detail of Hazelwood. To do otherwise is to jeopardize the beauty of the
First Amendment.
6- STEPHEN J. GOULD, WONDERFUL LIFE: THE BURGESS SHALE AND THE NATURE OF
HISTORY 13 (1989).
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